Upgrading Bitcoin: Segregated Witness

Dr. Johnson Lau Bitcoin Core Contributor Co-author of Segregated Witness BIPs 141-143 16-March-2016

Topics

- A short introduction to Bitcoin transactions
- What is transaction malleability and why it is bad
- Segregated witness as the solution
- Bonus of deploying segregated witness
- User experience
- Safety issues of deploying segregated witness

Bitcoin Transaction is like a cheque



Alice: 25 BTC

Bitcoin Transaction is like a cheque

Bitcoin Bank	Date: 14-03-2016
From: Mining reward	
To: Alice	
Amount: 25BTC	Signature:

Bitcoin Bank		Date: 15-0	
From:	 Bitcoin Bank From: Mining reward To: Alice Amount: 25BTC Signature 	Date: 14-03-2016 gnature:	
To: Bob			
Amount	t: 25BTC		Signature: Alic

Alice: 25 BTC

03-2016

Alice: 0 BTC Bob: 25 BTC

Bitcoin Transaction is like a cheque



BITCO	in Bank		Date: 15-0
From:	 Bitcoin Bank From: Mining reward To: Alice Amount: 25BTC Si 	Date: 14-03-2016 ignature:	
To: Bob			
Amount	t: 25BTC		Signature: Alic

Passing on





Alice: 0 BTC Bob: 0 BTC Carl: 24.99 BTC

Fee: 0.01 BTC

Alice: 0 BTC Bob: 0 BTC Carl: 0 BTC David: 24.99 BTC

Bitcoin Bank	Date: 14-0	03-2016
From: Mining reward		
To: Alice		
Amount: 25BTC	Signature:	
	Bitcoin Bank	Date: 15-
	From: Miningreward To: Alice Amount: 25BTC Signature:	216
	To: Bob	
	Amount: 25BTC	Signature: Alia
		Bitcoin Bank
		From: To: Bob Amount: 25BTC Signature: #UK
		To: Carl
		Amount: 24.99BTC











m-of-n multi-signature e.g. 2-of-3 multi-sig



Amount: 25BTC



Edwin

Date: 14-03-2016

Signature: Carl Edwin

Bitcoin



Payable to bearer cheque





Bitcoin Bank	Date: 17-03-2016	Date: 17-03-2016			
From: To: Bob Amount: 25BTC Signature:	e: 15-03-2016 Hice				
To: Anyone					
Amount: 25BTC	Signature: Bob				
Date: 14-03-2016	Bitcoin Bank Date: 14-03-2016 From: Date: 17-03-2016 To: Edwin				
ature:	Amount: 25BTC Signature:				
Date: 14-03-2016	Bitcoin Bank Date: 14-03-2016 From: Date: 17-03-2016 From: Date: 17-03-2016 From: Date: 12-03-2016 To: Miner				
ature:	Amount: 25BTC Signature:				

Bitcoin



Payable to bearer cheque





Bitcoin Bank	Date: 17-03-2016	
From: To: Bob Amount: 25BTC Signature:	15-03-2016	
To: Anyone		
Amount: 25BTC	Signature: Bob	
Date: 14-03-2016	Bitcoin Bank Date: 14-03-2016 From: <td< th=""><th></th></td<>	
ature:	Amount: 25BTC Signature:	
Date: 14-03-2016	Bitcoin Bank Date: 14-03-2016 From: Bitcoin Bank To: Miner	
ature:	Amount: 25BTC Signature:	

"Anyone-can-spend"

Payable to bearer cheque

Bitcoin Bank Date: 17-03-2016 From: To: David Amount: 25BTC Signature:



Transaction malleability

- The transaction ID may be changed by the payer or any other people before the transaction is confirmed by a miner The "appearance" of a cheque may be changed by the payer or any other people before the cheque is confirmed by the Bitcoin Bank
- Malleability by the payer (Double spending)
 - Malicious or legitimate
 - NOT fixable. The payer will always have the ability to change the txid until the tx is confirmed -> Unconfirmed tx is not safe unless you really trust the payer
- Malleability by any other people (Involuntary)
 - Signature malleability
 - Possible due to the mathematical property of the digital signature, and the flexibility of Bitcoin script language

Signature malleability All the following cheques are valid but not more than one might be confirmed

Bitco	in Bank	Date: 15-03-2016
From:	Bitcoin Bank Date: 14-03-2016 From: Mining reward To: Alice Amount: 25BTC Signature:	
To: Bob		
Amoun	t: 25BTC	Signature: <i>Alice</i>

Bitco	in Bank	Date: 15-03-2016
From:	Bitcoin Bank Date: 14-03-2016 From: Mining reward To: Alice Amount: 25BTC Signature:	
To: Bob		
Amoun	t: 25BTC	Signature: <i>Alice</i>

Bitco	oin Bank	Date: 15-03-2016
From:	Bitcoin Bank From: Mining reward To: Alice Amount: 25BTC Signature:	4-03-2016
To: Bob)	
Amoun	t: 25BTC	Signature: <i>Alice</i>

Bitco	in Bank		Date: 15-03-2016
From:	 Bitcoin Bank From: Miningreward To: Alice Amount: 25BTC 	Date: 14-03-2016 Signature:	
To: Bob)		11.
Amoun	t: 25BTC		Signature:

Why transaction malleability is bad?

- 1. The Tx ID is not final until the transaction is confirmed Tx ID usually won't change in traditional banking system • MtGox blamed tx malleability for loss of 850,000BTC
- 2. A chain of unconfirmed transactions is not safe • If the TxID of an earlier transaction in a chain is changed and confirmed, all subsequent transactions in the chain become invalid
- 3. It is not possible to construct a chain of transactions, without first signing an earlier transaction in the chain
 - To buy an apartment, you have to irreversibly pay the deposit BEFORE you sign ANY contract
- persist due to involuntary malleability.

Even if you fully trust your counterparty, the problems 1 and 2 still

Breaking	unconfirme(
Παπσαρπ	Bitcoin Bank	Date:	
	From: Mining reward		

T	o	:	Al	ic	e	

Amount: 25BTC

Date: 15-03-2016

To: Bob

Amount: 25BTC Signature:

Date: 14-03-2016

Bitcoin Bank

To: Alice

From: Mining reward

Amount: 25BTC

Bitcoin Bank

From:

Signature: Alice. .

Signature:

d tx chain with tx

Date: 14-03-2016					
nature:			I		
Bitcoin Bank	Date: 1	5-03-2016			
From: Miningreward To: Alice Amount: 25BTC Signature:	216				
To: Bob					
Amount: 25BTC	Signature:	ice			
	Bitcoin Bank		Date: 18-03	8-2016	
	From: To: Bob Amount: 25BTC Signature:	te: 15-03-2016 <i>Hlice</i>			
	To: Carl				
	Amount: 24.99BTC	Signatu	Ire: Bob		
		Bitcoin Bank		Da	te: 13-03-20
		From:	Date: 18-03-2016		
		To: Carl Amount: 24.99BTC	Signature: Bol		
		To: David			
		Amount: 24.99	BTC	Signature:	Carl



Breaking unconfirmed tx chain with tx malleability



14-03-2016						
Bitcoin Bank Date: 14-03-20 rom: Mining reward o: Alice mount: 25BTC Signature:	216	Date: 15-03-	2016			
25BTC	Signatur Bitcoin B From: To: Carl Amount: 2	Alice ank bank Date: 15-03-2016 SIgnature: Alice	Signatu	Date: 18-03	8-2016	
	Amount: 2	Fr To A	Bitcoin Bank Fom:	Date: 18-03-2016 Signature: Bold	Da Signature:	te: 13-03-20 Carl



Breaking unconfirmed tx chain with tx malleability



14-03-2016					
Bitcoin Bank Date: 14-03-2 rom: Mining reward o: Alice mount: 25BTC Signature:	Date: 1	.5-03-2016			
25BTC	Signature: Bitcoin Bank From: From: To: Carl	ice ate: 15-03-2016 Alice	Date: 18-03-2	016	
	Amount: 24.99BTC	Bitcoin Bank From: To: David Amount: 24.99	Date: 18-03-2016 Signature: Bold	Date: 13-0 Signature: Car	3-20 l



Scenario: Alice is paying 25BTC to Bob, but only if Bob agrees to pay 24.99BTC to Carl later.

Could she do it safely?

Method 1

 Alice creates the green cheque but not sign it

Bitco	in Bank		Date: 15-03-2016
From:	Bitcoin Bank From: Mining reward To: Alice Amount: 25BTC	Date: 14-03-2016 Signature:	
To: Bob	•		
Amoun	t: 25BTC		Signature:

- Alice creates the green cheque but not sign it
- Bob creates the yellow cheque and signs it

Bitco	in Bank	Date: 15-03-2016
From:	Bitcoin Bank Date: 14-03-2016 From: Mining reward To: Alice Amount: 25BTC Signature:	
To: Bob)	
Amoun	t: 25BTC	Signature:

Bitco	oin Bank	Date: 18-03-2016
From:	Bitcoin Bank Date: 15-03-2016 From: Dots: Date: 15-03-2016 To: Bob Amount: 25BTC Signature:	
To: Car		
Amoun	t: 24.99BTC	Signature: Bob

- Alice creates the green cheque but not sign it
- Bob creates the yellow cheque and signs it
- Since the green cheque has no signature and is invalid, the yellow cheque is also invalid

Bitco	in Bank		Date: 15-03-2016	
From:	Bitcoin Bank From: Miningreward To: Alice Amount: 25BTC	Date: 14-03-2016 Signature:		
To: Bob)			
Amoun	t: 25BTC	2	Signature:	

Bitcoin Bank	Date: 18-03-2016	
From: To: Bob Amount: 25BTC Signature:		
To: Carl	2 	
Amount: 24.99BTC	Signature: Bob	



Method 2

• Alice creates the green cheque but not sign it (invalid)

Bitco	in Bank		Date: 15-03-2016
From:	Bitcoin Bank From: Miningreward To: Alice Amount: 25BTC	Date: 14-03-2016 Signature:	
To: Bob			
Amoun	t: 25BTC	2	Signature:

- Alice creates the green cheque but not sign it (invalid)
- Bob creates the yellow cheque and signs it (invalid)

Bitco	in Bank	Date: 15-03-2016
From:	Bitcoin Bank Date: 14-03-2016 From: Miningreward To: Alice Amount: 25BTC Signature:	
To: Bob		
Amoun	t: 25BTC	Signature:



- Alice creates the green cheque but not sign it (invalid)
- Bob creates the yellow cheque and signs it (invalid)
- Alice signs the green cheque (valid)







- Alice creates the green cheque but not sign it (invalid)
- Bob creates the yellow cheque and signs it (invalid)
- Alice signs the green cheque (valid)
- The yellow cheque is still invalid since it is based on the unsigned green cheque







- Alice creates the green cheque and sign it (valid)
- Bob may just take the money and run away

Bitco	oin Bank	Date: 15-03-2016	
From:	Bitcoin Bank Date: 14-03-2016 From: Mining reward To: Alice Amount: 25BTC Signature:		
To: Bob)		
Amour	it: 25BTC	Signature: <i>Alice</i>	



Solution to involuntary malleability : Segregated witness

- Proposed by Pieter Wuille
- Transaction could be divided in the 2 parts:
 - Base data: where the money comes and goes
 - (signature)

Base data	Bitcoin Bank			
	From:	Bitcoin Bank Date: 15-03-2016 From: Image: Compared with the second withe second withe second with the second withe second with		
	To: Ca	rl		
	Amoun	nt: 24.99BTC		

Witness data: information to verify the correctness of the base data

Segregated witness: separating base data and witness data



Witness data

New rules introduced by SegWit

- Instead of paying to "Alice", we pay to "Anyone (segwit Alice)"
- When Alice wants to spend the money, she MUST NOT sign on the cheque.
- Instead, Alice signs on a separate paper and attach it to the cheque • For people who enforce the new rules, they will verify the signature as they know the money actually belongs to "segwit Alice", not "Anyone"
- If the signature field on the cheque is not exactly blank, people who enforce the new rules will reject the cheque • Involuntary malleability becomes impossible
- For people who do not know the new rules...
 - The cheque is valid because the money was sent to "Anyone" and did not require any signature to spend
 - They don't understand "segwit Alice" and will just ignore it
 - They will not see the real signature

Without segwit



With segwit







Segregated witness

- Two types of malleability
 - Signature malleability
 - Double spending
- The cheque itself still looks the same (the TxID is not changed)
- With segwit, signature malleability becomes irrelevant Double spending becomes the only type of transaction malleability
 - Not fixable: unconfirmed txs are always unsafe • Use multi-signature to prevent unexpected double spending by the
 - counterparty
- A transaction chain could be constructed without first signing an earlier transaction in the chain

Signature malleability won't break the tx chain

		Bitcoin Bank
		From: Mining reward To: Alice Amount: 25BTC Signature:
		To: Anyone (Segwit Bob)
Bob		Amount: 25BTC
	Bitcoin Bank Date: 15-03-2016 From: Date: 15-03-2016 To: Anyone (Segwit Bob) Diment: 25BTC	Date: 18-03-2016
	To: Carl	
	Amount: 24.99BTC	Signature:
		Bitcoin Bank
		From: To: Carl Amount: 24.99BTC Signature:
		To: David
		Amount: 24.99BTC



pay 24.99BTC to Carl later.

refuse to send to Carl

Use segwit and 2-of-2 multisig

- Scenario: Alice is paying 25BTC to Bob, but only if Bob agrees to
- However, Alice worries that Bob will just take the money and

Alice has 25BTC in a seguit address, already 1. confirmed

Bitcoin Bank Date: 14-03-2016 From: Mining reward To: Anyone (Segwit Alice) Amount: 25BTC Signature:



- Alice has 25BTC in a seguit address, already 1. confirmed
- 2. Alice creates the green cheque, sending 25BTC to "Segwit 2 of Alice and Bob", but do NOT attach a signature



Bitcoin Bank			Date: 15-03-2016	
From:	 Bitcoin Bank From: Mining reward To: Anyone (Segwit Alice) Amount: 25BTC 	Date: 14-03-2016 Signature:		
To: Anyone (Segwit 2 of Alice and Bob)				
Amour	nt: 25BTC		Signature:	



- Alice has 25BTC in a seguit address, already 1. confirmed
- 2. Alice creates the green cheque, sending 25BTC to "Segwit 2 of Alice and Bob", but do NOT attach a signature
- Based on the green cheque, Alice and Bob 3. create the yellow cheque, sending 24.99BTC to Carl, and sign it.
 - The yellow cheque is invalid at this moment since the green check has not signature attached





- Alice has 25BTC in a seguit address, already 1. confirmed
- 2. Alice creates the green cheque, sending 25BTC to "Segwit 2 of Alice and Bob", but do NOT attach a signature
- Based on the green cheque, Alice and Bob 3. create the yellow cheque, sending 24.99BTC to Carl, and sign it.
 - The yellow cheque is invalid at this moment since the green check has not signature attached
- 4. After the yellow cheque has Bob's signature attached, Alice signs the green cheque
 - Both green and yellow cheques become valid







- Alice has 25BTC in a seguit address, already 1. confirmed
- 2. Alice creates the green cheque, sending 25BTC to "Segwit 2 of Alice and Bob", but do NOT attach a signature
- Based on the green cheque, Alice and Bob 3. create the yellow cheque, sending 24.99BTC to Carl, and sign it.
 - The yellow cheque is invalid at this moment since the green check has not signature attached
- 4. After the yellow cheque has Bob's signature attached, Alice signs the green cheque
 - Both green and yellow cheques become valid \bullet
- 5. Bonus: If both Alice and Bob agree, they can sign another cheque, dated before 18-03-2016, sending the money to another person



- Increasing the maximum block size from 1MB to effectively 1.75-4MB
 - Since the witness data is not visible to existing software, it won't be counted in the block size limit
 - Allow more transactions in a block
- Existing transaction format still works in the same way as before • Upgrade is mandatory for miners only

 - Non-upgraded wallets will keep functioning (no malleability protection) • Seamlessly sending money between upgraded and non-upgraded wallets • Upgraded wallets will enjoy ~50% discount in transaction fee due to the use of the cheaper space for witness data

- Transmission and storage of witness data becomes optional Base data alone is enough for telling the full history of transactions • Witness data is needed only if a wallet wants to validate transactions • Most light wallets do not validate transactions
- - Witness data long time ago may be removed, assuming no one would challenge its validity
 - Some archival network nodes may still keep witness data

- Fully enabling smart contracts

 - Lightning Network: instant confirmation with very low cost
- Introduction of new script system becomes much easier
 - BIP143: to be deployed with segregated witness (BIP141)
 - Bug fix for transaction validation
 - Future
 - Efficient signature system, e.g. Schnorr signature

• Many smart contracts require chains of multi-signature transactions

• Fee calculation becomes much easier for hardware wallets / cold wallets

• Compressing long and conditional scripts: Merklized abstract syntax tree (MAST)

- Introduction of fraud proof system
 - Bitcoin White Paper: "(SPV wallets) accept alerts from network nodes when they detect an invalid block, prompting the user's software to download the full block and alerted transactions to confirm the inconsistency"
 - Compact fraud proof is currently not possible in some situations
 - Excessive minting
 - Excessive block size
 - Spending of a non-existing input
 - Extra witness data can be committed that allows short proofs of block invalidity that light wallets can quickly verify

User experience

- If you do not upgrade your wallet:
 - You can receive payment from any wallets, upgraded or not, through 1-initial or 3-initial addresses (without any benefit of segwit)
 - You can pay a non-upgraded wallet, through an 1-initial or 3-initial address (without any benefit of segwit)
 - You can pay an upgraded wallet, through a 3-initial address • You won't enjoy any benefit of seguit
- - The payee will enjoy the benefit of seguit when they spend the bitcoin later
- If you upgrade your wallet:
 - You can receive payment from any wallets, upgraded or not, through 3initial addresses
 - ~50% transaction fee discount (relative to non-upgraded wallet) is expected when you spend your bitcoin, depending on the proportion of witness data
 - Multisig tx will enjoy more discount
 - Tx with many inputs but a few outputs will enjoy more discount

Safety issues in the deployment of SegWit

- It is a softfork:
 - Upgrade is mandatory for miners (mining pools) only
 - blockchain split is not possible

 - spend scripts (BIP16)
- Testing and peer reviewing
 - Segwit has been tested in sidechains for > 6 months
 - December 2015

• As long as vast majority of miners enforce the new rules, sustained

• We have profound experience of deploying softfork: BIPs16, 34, 66, 65 • This is not the first time we change the meaning of some anyone-can-

• Bitcoin segregated witness testnet ("segnet") has been running since

- - OP_0 <20-byte-public-key-hash>
 - "P2WPKH": Pay-to-witness-public-key-hash
- To spend P2WPKH:
 - The scriptSig must be exactly empty
 - The witness must contain exactly 2 items: signature and public key
- - See BIP141 for details

• A traditional 1-initial address represents a scriptPubKey like this: • OP_DUP OP_HASH160 < 20-byte-public-key-hash> OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG

• With the same public key hash, the equivalent seguit scriptPubKey is:

• In the original script language, this scriptPubKey is anyone-can-spend, since it does not contain any functional code, and the last push is non-zero

• We also define P2WSH (Pay-to-witness-script-hash) which allows arbitrarily complex scripts, similar to P2SH (pay-to-script-hash, BIP16)





- Commitment of witness data
 - coinbase transaction.
 - by the 32-byte commitment hash
 - highest output index is assumed to be the commitment.
- Witness data discount
 - A 75% discount is given to the witness data
 - Block size limit: base data size + (witness data size / 4) \leq 1MB

• Witness data is committed as a Merkel Root in one of the outputs of the

• The commitment is recorded in a scriptPubKey of the coinbase transaction. It must be at least 38 bytes, with the first 6-byte of 0x6a24aa21a9ed, followed

• If there are more than one scriptPubKey matching the pattern, the one with

• Extra space is reserved for commitments required by future softforks.

- There are at least 2 weaknesses in the original signature verification algorithm:
- The verification time grows quadratically, instead of linearly, as the number of signature operations increase.
 - A normal 1 MB block should take 2 seconds to verify
 - A 1MB transaction with 5569 signature operations may take 25 seconds to verify; a 2MB transaction may take > 10 minutes
- The algorithm does not involve the amount of Bitcoin being spent by the input. Offline transaction signing device ("cold wallet") are unable to calculate the exact amount being spent and the transaction fee

 - A cold wallet must acquire the full transaction being spent, just for calculation of fee • Difficult for lightweight, air-gapped wallet.
- BIP143 introduces a new signature verification algorithm to segwit transactions to solve these problems



- A new serialization format is defined



Non-segwit transaction must use the original serialization format Segwit transaction use the new format when witness data is included

Technical details: BIP142 (deferred)

- There are 2 ways for using seguit:
 - Native seguit (more efficient)
 - Segwit in P2SH (less efficient as it requires extra base data space)
- BIP142 defines new address format for native seguit use • Not deployed in the initial release for seguit
- "Segwit in P2SH" allows non-upgraded wallets pay to upgraded wallets through 3-initial addresses
- Native seguit is still possible without BIP142
 - BIP70 Payment Protocol
 - Raw transactions (dangerous!!!)

BIP62: an incomplete fix

- "Dealing with malleability" by Pieter Wuille Canonical signature approach: Limiting the way people may sign a transaction
 - For involuntary signature malleability only
 - Voluntary signature malleability / double-spending is not fixable
- It is an incomplete fix, because
 - New mathematical malleability might be found in the future and bring us back to the square one
 - It fixes malleability in only some common cases
 - In the case of an m-of-n multisig, ANY 1 of the n people may change the Tx ID without the consent of other people (due to voluntary signature malleability)
 - earlier tx in the chain

• It is still not possible to construct a chain of txs, without first signing an